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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance in Australia acts as an 
important control mechanism that links the 
direction of an organisation with its economic, social 
and environmental (i.e. Triple Bottom Line) 
performance. This article will provide a summary of 
what the corporate governance concept means in the 
Australian context, before describing the legal and 
regulatory framework that underpins the concept in 
that country. Next, this article will provide an 
overview of the external market for corporate 
control, and the implications this has for the typical 
ownership structures and remuneration practices 
(for boards of directors). Lastly, this article will 
focus on specific shareholder rights and shareholder 
activism in Australia, and how these together 
influence the way Australian corporations link 
corporate governance practices to organisational 
performance and standards of corporate social 
responsibility.  
To date, corporate governance in Australia has 
been studied from a variety of theoretical 
perspectives, in particular, agency theory, 
stewardship theory, resource dependency theory, 
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shareholder theory, and stakeholder theory. Most 
notably, scholars from organisational theory, 
strategic management (Boyd, 1995), sociology 
(Useem, 1984), finance (Fama, 1980), economics 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and law (Richards & 
Stearn, 1999) have provided the basis for the 
majority of Australia‟s corporate governance 
research over the past three decades1. The myriad of 
approaches to the topic has resulted in many 
normative definitions in the Australian context (that 
might best be described as a set of descriptive 
statements about what corporate governance “may 
include”, or “might do”, etc. rather than a sound 
theoretical basis for promoting corporate 
transparency). Often the quasi-definitions appear in 
authoritative academic literature, where authors 
consider corporate governance as merely the set of 
methods to ensure that investors, suppliers of 
finance, shareholders, or creditors get a return on 
their investment. Sir Adrian Cadbury‟s (1992) 
definition of corporate governance is widely 
accepted as the most fitting for the egalitarian 
Australian context: “… [corporate governance 
represents] the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. Board of directors is 
responsible for the governance of their companies, 
ensuring that they are well run” (p. 2). The 
significance of corporate governance was captured 
in a broader definition authored by Cadbury (1992) 
who noted that the governance framework is there 
to encourage the efficient use of resources and 
equally to require accountability for the stewardship 
of those resources.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. 
Section 1 provides a definition of corporate 
governance. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
with a focus on the Australian legal and regulatory 
framework. Section 3 will discuss the topic of 
market for corporate control and examine Tricker‟s 
model of corporate governance. Section 4 will 
outline the role of Australian directors with 
emphasis on structure, process and directors 
behavioural dynamics. Section 5 will discuss board 
of directors practices including current 
remuneration practices. Section 6 outlines 
ownership structures of Australian companies. 
Sections 7 and 8 focus on shareholder‟s rights 
protection and activism. Section 9 will examine the 
relationship between a corporate governance 
framework and financial performance and section 
10 will discuss briefly corporate social 
responsibility. The final section sets out future 
research and provides a conclusion. 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA 
 
In Australia, a board of directors is a legal 
requirement set out in the Corporations Act 2001 
(Commonwealth). Boards of directors are 
fundamental to corporate governance, with 
legislation outlining certain powers and 
responsibilities to be carried out for the best 
                                                          
1From an international perspective on corporate governance there have been 
significant legislative reforms, in particular in countries such as the United 
Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA). In the UK, corporate 
governance standards are clearly set out in the Cadbury Committee (1992), 
Greenbury Committee (1995), Hampel Committee (1998), LSE (1998) to 
protect shareholder’s interests. In the USA, the Round Table (1997) and The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 set new or enhanced standards for all U.S. public 
company boards to observe. 
interests of the relevant shareholders (and indirectly 
to the entire market). In terms of its prime directive, 
the legal framework in Australia is not primarily 
concerned with adding value to the organisation 
(although it does attempt to protect shareholder 
rights); instead is based on the traditional 
conventions of Anglo-Saxon trust law. The 
Corporations Act 2001 (Commonwealth) provides a 
mandatory legal requirement that all Australian 
companies must have directors. There are different 
requirements for a proprietary company which have 
at least one director (section 201A(1)) compared to a 
public company that must have a minimum of three 
directors (section 201A(2)). The board of directors 
according to ASX CGC Principle 2: 
An effective board is one that facilitates the 
effective discharge of the duties imposed by law 
on the directors and adds value in a way that is 
appropriate to the particular company’s 
circumstance. 
The importance of corporate governance in 
Australia was initially recognised in 1995, with the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) introducing 
Listing Rule 3C(3)(i) requiring listed companies to 
include in their annual report a statement of the 
main corporate governance practices they had 
adopted (Henry, 2010). Subsequently, and in 
response to criticism following the aftermath of 
corporate collapses, the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council (ASX CGC) released in March 2003, the first 
version of the ASX Corporate Governance Principles 
and Guidelines (ASX Guidelines). These guidelines 
have been further revised are designed to provide 
best practice corporate governance measures for 
ASX listed entities. They are based around eight 
central principles and 29 specific recommendations 
published by the Australian Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Council (2014), which is an 
important document outlining key elements of 
corporate governance released in May 2014. 
In 2017, the ASX CGC agreed that it was 
necessary to commence work on a fourth edition of 
the Principles and Recommendations to address 
emerging issues around culture, values and trust, 
fuelled by recent examples of conduct by some 
listed entities falling short of community standards 
and expectations. The fourth edition of the 
Principles and Recommendations takes effect for an 
entity‟s first full financial year commencing on or 
after 1 January 2020. Entities with a 31 December 
balance date will be expected to measure their 
governance practices against the recommendations 
in the fourth edition commencing with the financial 
year ended 31 December 2020. Entities with a 30 
June balance date will be expected to measure their 
governance practices against the recommendations 
in the fourth edition commencing with the financial 
year ended 30 June 2021 (ASX CGC, 2019). 
 
Table 1. The principles and recommendations of the 
ASX CGC (2014) 
 
No. Principles and recommendations 
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight 
2. Structure the board of directors to add value 
3. Act ethically and responsibly 
4. Safeguard integrity in corporate reporting 
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure 
6. Respect the rights of security holders 
7. Recognise and manage risk 
8. Remunerate fairly and responsibly 
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Table 2 below highlights the recent changes by 
the ASX CGC in 2019 to take into consideration a 
number of important factors such as culture, values 
and trust within Australian corporations as a result 
of the investigations by the Royal Commission into 
the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry. Namely, a listed entity should instil and 
continually reinforce a culture across the 
organisation of acting lawfully, ethically and 
responsibly. Commissioner Kenneth M. Hayne (2019) 
in the Final Report: Royal Commission into 
Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and 
Financial Services Industry, stated that: “Boards 
cannot operate properly without having the right 
information. And boards do not operate effectively 
if they do not challenge management” (p. 396). In 
relation to Principle 3, the ASX CGC in 2019 have 
made it clear that the broader community and 
investors expect a listed entity to act lawfully, 
ethically and responsibly and that expectation 
should be reflected in its statement of values. In 
formulating its values, entities need to consider 
what behaviours are needed from its officers and 
employees to build long term sustainable value for 
its security holders. 
Hayne (2018) from the Interim Report: Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry 
noted that:  
As [a commercial enterprise], [a listed] entity … 
rightly pursues profit. Directors and other 
officers of the entities owe duties to shareholders 
to do that. But the duty to pursue profit is one 
that has a significant temporal dimension. The 
duty is to pursue the long-term advantage of the 
enterprise. The pursuit of long-term advantage 
… entails preserving and enhancing the 
reputation of the enterprise … But to preserve 
and enhance a reputation … the enterprise must 
do more than not break the law. It must seek to 
do ‘the right thing’ (pp. 54-55). 
 
Table 2. The principles and recommendations of the 
ASX CGC (2019) 
 
No. Principles and recommendations 
1. Lay solid foundations for management and oversight. 
2. 
Structure the board of directors to be effective and 
add value. 
3. 
Instil a culture of acting lawfully, ethically and 
responsibly. 
4. Safeguard the integrity in corporate reporting. 
5. Make timely and balanced disclosure. 
6. Respect the rights of security holders. 
7. Recognise and manage risk. 
8. Remunerate fairly and responsibly. 
 
In relation to Principle 1 – Recommendation 1.1A 
listed entity should have and disclose a board 
charter setting out: 1) the respective roles and 
responsibilities of its board and management; 
2) those matters expressly reserved to the board and 
those delegated to management.  
As a general rule, the board of a listed entity 
should be responsible under its charter for:  
 demonstrating leadership;  
 defining the entity‟s purpose and setting its 
strategic objectives;  
 approving the entity‟s statement of values 
and code of conduct to underpin the desired culture 
within the entity; 
 appointing the chair and, if the entity has 
one, the deputy chair and/or the “senior 
independent director”; 
 appointing and replacing the CEO; 
 approving the appointment and 
replacement of other senior executives and the 
company secretary; 
 overseeing management in its 
implementation of the entity‟s strategic objectives, 
instilling of the entity‟s values and performance 
generally;  
 approving operating budgets and major 
capital expenditure;  
 overseeing the integrity of the entity‟s 
accounting and corporate reporting systems, 
including the external audit; 
 overseeing the entity‟s process for making 
timely and balanced disclosure of all material 
information concerning the entity that a reasonable 
person would expect to have a material effect on the 
price or value of the entity‟s securities; 
 satisfying itself that the entity has in place 
an appropriate risk management framework (for 
both financial and nonfinancial risks) and setting the 
risk appetite within which the board expects 
management to operate; 
 satisfying itself that an appropriate 
framework exists for relevant information to be 
reported by management to the board;  
 whenever required, challenging 
management and holding it to account; 
 satisfying itself that the entity‟s 
remuneration policies are aligned with the entity‟s 
purpose, values, strategic objectives and risk 
appetite;  
 monitoring the effectiveness of the entity‟s 
governance practices (ASX CGC, 2019, p. 6). 
Despite the fact that the principles and 
recommendations listed above were only intended to 
apply to ASX listed entities (albeit not mandatorily), 
many other Australian entities have adopted them 
(as appropriate) to form part of their own 
governance framework. 
 
3. MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
 
Tricker‟s (1995) model of corporate governance in 
Figure 1 (below) provides a starting point to examine 
the role of corporate governance as an external 
control for Australian corporations (in both national 
and international markets). The typical external 
market control measures apparent in open market 
contexts (i.e. hostile take-over bids, buying 
controlling interests, removal of board of directors 
by shareholders, etc.) operate in Australia and 
manifest in the following ways: increased regulatory 
compliance; internal monitoring; self-regulation of 
individual trustees and directors, monitoring of 
board of directors‟ collective performance (which 
includes scrutiny of strategy formulation and 
policymaking); change in organisational strategy, etc. 
The board of trustees or company directors is an 
important internal governance mechanism that 
exists to monitor external market expectations and 
change/adapt a strategy to meet them (see the 
relationship described in Figure 2). 
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Figure 1. Tricker‟s model of corporate governance 
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Source: Tricker (1995). 
 
Monks and Minow (2004) refer to a tri-partite of 
participants in the corporate governance framework 
that must work together for mutual benefit (see 
Figure 2): shareholders, management (led by the 
Chief Executive Officer) and the board of directors. 
Australia is thought to be characteristic of the 
„outsider system‟ of corporate governance, where 
key elements of corporate governance include: board 
of directors structure, board of directors process, 
and board of directors behavioural dynamics. 
 
Figure 2. Corporate governance framework in the 21st century 
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4.  THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
 
4.1. Board of directors structure 
 
Board of directors structure concerns its size, board 
of directors composition, skill sets and is important 
in the effectiveness of a board determining the 
ability of the board members to work together (Kiel 
et al., 2012). Each of these will be discussed in turn: 
1. Size: Clark (2004) argues that size is a 
hindrance to governance capacity and performance. 
Research by Jenkins (1993) recommends a limit of 
eight directors as any larger number will interfere 
with group dynamics and inhibit board of directors 
performance and a larger board brings a greater 
level of bureaucracy. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and 
Johnson (1998) viewpoint was less definitive noting 
that it is not the size of the board of directors that is 
critical, in relation to governance, but rather the 
number of outside members of the board. 
Notwithstanding this viewpoint, Kiel et al. (2012) 
notes that the key consideration should be around 
whether there are enough directors to provide the 
skills that the board of directors needs at the 
boardroom table. All the above researchers raise 
valid points and it is recommended in the Australian 
context that like that regardless of whether it is a 
commercial board of directors, superannuation 
board of directors of not-for-profit board of 
directors, that the board of directors size should be 
not exceeded eight or nine board members with the 
pre-requisite skills and experience that should be 
expected around a boardroom table. 
2. Board composition: Research suggests that 
board of directors composition does matter. Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) note that the 
board‟s composition and leadership structure can 
influence a variety of organisational outcomes 
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Daily & Dalton, 1992, 1993). 
Factors such as culture and ownership structure 
impact on board of directors composition (Kiel et al., 
2012). Related studies on the issue of the diversity 
of board of directors, and other have identified that 
the large majority of directors are white males from 
a managerial or professional background in their 
fifties or sixties and that a number of observations 
could be made about their personalities, including a 
personality profile to be much less risk-averse a 
diverse board (CAMAC, 2009). 
3. Trustee or director skillset: Trustee 
competence is gained from experience, skills, 
attitudes and knowledge (Kiel et al., 2012). 
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Behavioural competencies also influence the 
relationships around the boardroom table, in 
particular, between the board of directors and 
management and between trustees or directors (Kiel 
et al., 2012). The area of board of directors‟ skills 
and capabilities is an extremely important one in 
Australia and the author believes that it has not 
been given the attention that it currently deserves. 
Table 1 below provides insight into the sorts of 
expertise available by different types of directors or 
trustees. Notwithstanding, research by Thomas, 
Kidd, and Fernandez-Araoz (2007) found that after 
investigating over 100 boards of directors over a 
five-year period, many boards lack competent 
members. 
 
Table 3. Expertise of different type of directors or trustees 
 
Director category Areas of resources provided Type of director 
Insiders 
 Expertise on the firm, its strategy and direction; 
 Specific knowledge in areas such as finance and law. 
 Current and former officers of 
the firm. 
Business experts 
 Expertise in competition decision-making and problem-
solving in large firms; 
 Serve as „sounding boards‟ for ideas; 
 Alternative viewpoints on problems; 
 Channels of communication between firms; 
 Legitimacy. 
 Current and former senior 
officers of other large for-profit 
firms; 
 Directors of other large for-profit 
firms. 
Support specialists 
 Specialised expertise on law, banking, insurance and public 
relations; 
 Channels of communication to large and powerful 
suppliers or government agencies; 
 Ease of access to vital resources, such as financial capital 
and legal support; 
 Legitimacy. 
 Lawyers; 
 Bankers (commercial and 
investment); 
 Insurance company 
representatives; 
 Public relations experts. 
Community influentials 
 Non-business perspectives on issues, problems and ideas; 
 Influence with powerful stakeholders; 
 Representation of interests outside competitive products 
or supply markets; 
 Legitimacy. 
 Political leaders; 
 University faculty; 
 Members of clergy; 
 Leaders of social or community 
organisations. 
Source: Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold (2000). 
 
Demb and Neubauer (1990) acknowledge that 
“…there is no „perfect‟ structure for a board; each 
organisation must put a board of directors in place 
with composition and shape – tailored to fit its legal 
environment, the company‟s size and development 
stage, and the personality of its Chairman and CEO” 
(p. 156). Similarly, Kiel, et al. (2012) acknowledge 
that, “… no one particular board of directors 
structure will impact corporate performance more 
favourably than another structure” (p. 201). The 
structure of each board of directors needs to be 
determined by the characteristics of each entity in 
isolation. Regardless of the country of origin, board 
of directors roles such as monitoring and ratifying 
role (Bosch, 2005), supervisory and management 
function (Demb & Neubauer, 1992) and strategic and 
control roles of directors identified by leading 
international academics remain relevant to the 
Australian context. 
 
4.2. Board of directors process 
 
Board of directors processes is another element that 
should be recognised in any corporate governance 
framework. Process variables include frequency and 
length of meetings, formality of board of directors 
proceedings, board of directors evaluations, 
professional development, board of directors 
meeting agendas, board of directors minutes and 
committees. These processes are important in the 
overall context of corporate governance in Australia. 
 
4.3. Board of directors behavioural dynamics 
 
Kiel et al. (2012) defines board of directors 
behavioural dynamics as resulting from:  
… social and psychological processes occur 
between directors and between the board of 
directors and other groups, especially 
management. The individual and collective 
behaviours of the board and its members are 
dynamic as they continually change over time 
resulting from the changing issues facing the 
board at a particular point of time and the 
coming and going of individuals on both the 
board and in other groups (p. 608).  
The effectiveness of the board of directors in 
making decisions is clearly influenced by the 
behavioural characteristics of the directors that 
make up the board of directors (Leblanc & Gillies, 
2005). 
Board of directors behavioural dynamics is 
central to effective outcomes (Kiel et al., 2012) and 
appropriate boardroom behaviours are an essential 
component of best practice corporate governance as 
outlined by the UK Institute of Chartered Secretaries 
and Administrators. Board of directors behavioural 
dynamics can be an extremely difficult area for 
board members to address when they are dealing 
with individual trustees whose “… personality 
characteristics detract from the overall performance 
of the board of directors” (Kiel et al., 2012). Another 
level of complexity is added in the context of the 
ASI, where the trustee of an ASF is a representative 
appointed by a class of members and retains the 
support of that particular class of members. Kiel et 
al.‟s (2012) research positioned the board of 
directors behavioural dynamics at the centre of the 
corporate governance practice framework. Roberts, 
McNulty, and Stiles (2005) acknowledge that board 
of directors effectiveness “… depends upon the 
behavioural dynamics of a board and how the web of 
interpersonal and group relationships between 
executive and non-executives is developed in a 
particular company context” (p. 11). 
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Figure 3. A framework for considering board of directors behavioural dynamics 
 
 
Source: Kiel et. al. (2012). 
 
These researchers noted that there are four 
important drivers of board of directors behavioural 
dynamics that are set out in Figure 3. The first driver 
is in relation to the governance at a particular point 
in time. The second is the impact of both 
organisational and board cultures. The third driver 
relates to the Chair and CEO‟s personalities and how 
they interact with each other. The fourth driver 
involves the personalities of the trustee/directors. 
These researchers acknowledge that the behaviours 
of trustees reflect the board culture and the wider 
organisational culture (Kiel et al., 2012). Tricker, B. & 
Tricker, R. I. (2003) acknowledges that it is often 
more complicated: “Board behaviour does not 
consist of sets of contractual relationships, but is 
influenced by interpersonal behaviour, group 
dynamics and political intrigue” (p. 26). Judge (1989) 
further notes that board behaviour is often treated 
as a black “box” in these studies and researchers can 
only “… speculate on actual board behaviour”. 
 
5. BOARD OF DIRECTORS PRACTICES 
 
In governance theory, one of the main challenges for 
leaders today is to maintain the board of director‟s 
key role in the governance system (Demb & 
Neubauer, 1990) and it is recognised by this 
researcher as a major challenge moving forward for 
boards in Australia. The clear ramifications for 
governance for Australian boards of directors from 
an agency perspective is that adequate monitoring 
or control mechanisms need to be established to 
protect the members of the fund from 
management‟s conflict of interest – the so-called 
„agency costs‟ of modern capitalism (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This research supports the notion that in 
most instances, the board of directors in Australia is 
an important mechanism to alleviate agency 
problems in principal-agent relationships. Legally, 
the board of directors‟ monitors the board‟s 
functions and represents the shareholders‟ interests. 
The board of directors is elected by shareholders 
and has the ultimate decision-making and voting 
rights over the organisation‟s assets. In general, the 
chief executive officer reports directly to the board 
of directors.  
The two most important responsibilities for the 
board of directors in this regard are the strategic 
vision, setting the strategy and direction of the 
organisation; and the recruitment, performance 
management and termination (if necessary) of the 
CEO. In summary, the board of an Australian entity 
would deal with both the strategic direction and 
trying to maintain a sustainable competitive 
advantage of the organisation in an ever-changing 
economic landscape. Whereas, the CEO and other 
senior managers would deal on a daily basis with the 
operational matters of the business. There is 
considerable debate on whether the board develops 
or ratifies the strategy of the organisation. Fama and 
Jensen‟s (1983) research, for example, outlines the 
different arguments pertaining to this notion. For 
the sake of completeness, it is noteworthy that the 
board of directors in Australia can comprise of both 
independent and non-executive directors; the 
Australian Stock Exchange (2003) definition states 
that:  
An independent director is a non-executive 
director who is not a member of management 
and who is free of any business or other 
relationship that could materially interfere 
with – or could reasonably be perceived to 
materially interfere with – the independent 
exercise of their judgment. 
Boards of directors in Australia need to 
consider a suitable mix of independent directors for 
the board composition. The ASX CGC recommends 
that a majority of the board of directors should be 
independent directors and that the roles of the chair 
and the chief executive officers should not be 
exercised by the same individual. Company Law in 
Australia sets out directors‟ general duties imposed 
by the Corporations Act on directors include: 
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1. The duty to exercise their powers and 
duties with the care and diligence that a reasonable 
person would have which includes taking steps to 
ensure you are properly informed about the 
financial position of the company and ensuring the 
company does not trade if it is insolvent. 
2. The duty to exercise your powers and duties 
in good faith in the best interests of the company. 
3. The duty not to improperly use your 
position to gain an advantage for yourself or 
someone else, or to cause detriment to the company. 
4. The duty not to improperly use information 
obtained through your position to gain an advantage 
for yourself or to cause detriment to the company. 
Directors have a positive duty to prevent your 
company from trading if it is insolvent. The 
Australian Investments and Security Commission 
(AISC) issued a Regulatory Guide (RG-217) on the 
duty to prevent insolvent trading for directors. 
In Australia, a director‟s legal duty is to the 
company itself and they are not to act for any 
personal gain. As pointed out by Dellaportas, 
Thomsen, and Conyon (2012) “… this differs slightly 
from the US, which relies on a shareholder-centric 
common law system, and the UK, in which a legal 
duty is owed to stakeholders as well as 
shareholders” (p. 276). 
 
5.1. Board of directors’ remuneration practices 
 
The board of directors is responsible for 
determining a remuneration policy and the level of 
compensation for both directors and senior 
executives in Australia. Remuneration is varied 
among board of directors in Australia. Under section 
300A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), listed 
companies must present a remuneration report to 
shareholders at every annual general meeting 
showing the board‟s policies for determining the 
nature and amount of remuneration paid to key 
management personnel (which includes any 
director). In 2012, the ASIC announced that 
companies should improve their practices with 
respect to the disclosure of their remuneration 
arrangements for directors and executives of 
publicly listed companies. This followed on from a 
review of 50 remuneration reports – drawn from 300 
of Australia‟s biggest companies – for the year 
ended 30 June 2011: “It is important for the 
integrity of the market and investor confidence that 
there is a high level of compliance with the executive 
remuneration laws” (ASIC Deputy Chairman Belinda 
Gibson). Gibson (2012) also noted that those 
companies need to also provide shareholders with a 
better understanding of why directors have adopted 
the remuneration arrangements they have and 
provide sufficient detail on the remuneration 
arrangements to enable shareholders to assess the 
appropriateness of them in the company‟s 
circumstances. 
The role of the remuneration committee was 
considered by the Governance Institute of Australia 
(The Institute) in 2014. The Institute published a 
Good Governance Guide noting that the role of the 
remuneration committee should take account of 
disclosure of remuneration policies, level and mix of 
remuneration; and the process for setting 
remuneration and assessing performance. Further, 
the ASX CGC noted that a Remuneration Committee 
may be a more efficient vehicle to focus on a 
remuneration policy rather than the full board of 
directors. 
In 2019, the ASX CGC have been very 
considered in their approach to the role of the 
remuneration committee. In the Principle 8 – 
Remunerate fairly and responsibly from the recent 
Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGC, 2019) it 
was noted that a listed entity should pay director 
remuneration sufficient to attract and retain 
high-quality directors and design its executive 
remuneration to attract, retain and motivate 
high-quality senior executives and to align their 
interests with the creation of value for security 
holders and with the entity‟s values and risk 
appetite.  
 
Recommendation 8.1  
 
The board of a listed entity should: 1) have a 
remuneration committee which: 
 has at least three members, a majority of 
whom are independent directors; 
 is chaired by an independent director, and 
disclose; 
 the charter of the committee;  
 the members of the committee;  
 as at the end of each reporting period, the 
number of times the committee met throughout the 
period and the individual attendances of the 
members at those meetings; or 2) if it does not have 
a remuneration committee, disclose that fact and the 
processes it employs for setting the level and 
composition of remuneration for directors and 
senior executives and ensuring that such 
remuneration is appropriate and not excessive. 
The ASX CGC (2019) noted that remuneration is 
a key driver of culture and a major focus for 
investors. It also noted that when entities set the 
level and composition of remuneration, a listed 
entity needs to balance:  
 its desire to attract and retain high-quality 
directors and to attract, retain and motivate senior 
executives;  
 the need to ensure that the incentives for 
executive directors and other senior executives 
encourage them to pursue the growth and success of 
the entity without rewarding conduct that is 
contrary to the entity‟s values or risk appetite;  
 the need to ensure that the incentives for 
non-executive directors do not conflict with their 
obligation to bring an independent judgement to 
matters before the board;  
 the implications for its reputation and 
standing in the community if it is seen to pay 
excessive remuneration to directors and senior 
executives; 
 its commercial interest in controlling 
expenses.  
A listed entity should have a formal, rigorous 
and transparent process for developing its 
remuneration policy and for fixing the remuneration 
packages of directors and senior executives. Having 
a separate remuneration committee can be an 
efficient and effective mechanism to bring the focus 
and independent judgement needed on 
remuneration decisions.  
The role of the remuneration committee is to 
review and make recommendations to the board in 
relation to:  
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 the entity‟s remuneration framework for 
directors, including the process by which any pool of 
directors‟ fees approved by security holders is 
allocated to directors; 
 the remuneration packages to be awarded 
to senior executives; 
 equity-based remuneration plans for senior 
executives and other employees; 
 superannuation arrangements for directors, 
senior executives and other employees; 
 whether there is any gender or other 
inappropriate bias in remuneration for directors, 
senior executives, or other employees.  
It is important that the remuneration 
committee have a charter that sets out its role and 
confers on it all necessary powers to perform that 
role. This will include the right to obtain 
information, interview management, and seek advice 
from external consultants or specialists where the 
committee considers that necessary or appropriate 
(ASX CGC, 2019, p. 30). 
The remuneration committee should be of 
sufficient size (no definitive number given) and 
independence to discharge its mandate effectively. 
Regardless of whether there is a remuneration 
committee, no individual director or senior executive 
should be involved in deciding his or her own 
remuneration. 
Hayne (2018) in the Interim Report: Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry 
noted that:  
… staff and others engaged by an entity will 
treat as important what they believe that the 
entity values. Rewarding volume and amount of 
sales is the clearest signal that selling is what 
the entity values. What staff and others believe 
that the entity values inform what they do. It is 
a critical element in forming the culture of the 
entity (p. 55).  
The individual remuneration packages to be 
awarded to employees other than senior executives 
are generally matters left to management. Listed 
companies established in Australia need to consider 
the provisions in sections 206K-206M of the 
Corporations Act in relation to the engagement of 
remuneration consultants to advise on the 
remuneration packages to be awarded to key 
management personnel. 
 
Table 4. Australian executive remuneration suggested guidelines 
 
 Executive remuneration Non-executive director remuneration 
Composition 
Appropriate balance of fixed remuneration 
and performance-based remuneration. 
By way of cash fees, superannuation 
contributions and non-cash benefits in lieu 
of fees (such as salary sacrifice into 
superannuation or equity). 
Fixed remuneration 
Reasonable and fair, taking into account 
the entity‟s obligations at law and labour 
market conditions, and relative to the scale 
of the entity‟s business. It should reflect 
core performance requirements and 
expectations. 
Should reflect the time commitment and 
responsibilities of the role. 
Performance-based remuneration 
Linked to clearly specified performance 
targets. These targets should be aligned to 
the entity‟s short, medium and longer-term 
performance objectives and should be 
consistent with its circumstances, purpose, 
strategic goals, values and risk appetite.  
Should not receive performance-based 
remuneration as it may lead to bias in their 
decision-making and compromise their 
objectivity. 
Equity-based remuneration 
Well-designed equity-based remuneration, 
including options or performance rights, 
may be an effective form of remuneration, 
especially when linked to hurdles that are 
aligned to the entity‟s short, medium and 
longer-term performance objectives. Care 
needs to be taken in the design of equity-
based remuneration schemes, however, to 
ensure that they do not lead to 
“short-termism” on the part of senior 
executives or the taking of undue risks. 
Acceptable to receive securities as part of 
their remuneration to align their interests 
with the interests of other security holders. 
They should not receive options with 
performance hurdles attached or 
performance rights as part of their 
remuneration as it may lead to bias in their 
decision-making and compromise their 
objectivity. 
Termination payments 
For senior executives should be agreed in 
advance and the agreement should clearly 
address what will happen in the case of 
early termination. No payment for a 
removal for misconduct. 
Should not be provided with retirement 
benefits other than superannuation. 
Source: ASX CGC (2019). 
 
6. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF COMPANIES IN 
AUSTRALIA 
 
Australian corporations must be registered by the 
Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) and they legally operate under the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). In relation to the 
limitation of liability of a company in Australia, 
there are two different types: „Limited by guarantee‟ 
(i.e. the liability of members is restricted to an 
amount set out in the company constitution) and 
„Limited by shares‟. Contemporary literature refers 
primarily to two model types for corporate 
governance, namely, the outsider and insider models 
(Keasey, Thompson, & Wright, 1997; Solomon, 2007). 
Solomon (2007) points out that:  
Every country exhibits a unique system of 
corporate governance: there are as many 
corporate governance systems as there are 
countries. The system of corporate governance 
presiding in any one country is determined by a 
wide array of internal factors including ownership 
structure, the state of the economy, the legal 
system, and government policies (p. 181). 
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7. SHAREHOLDER'S RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 
There are various types of shareholders in Australia 
ranging from small „mum and dad investors‟, to 
wealthy private individuals, to large institutional 
investors (such as superannuation (i.e. pension) 
funds)). The Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) sets out 
the rights pertaining to all shareholders in Australia. 
The Corporations Law deals with becoming a 
shareholder and ceasing to be a shareholder in 
sections 117, 120, 601AA–601AD of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Australian companies 
may have different classes of shares. The rights and 
restrictions attached to the shares in a class 
distinguish it from other classes of shares are 
sections 254A–254B of the Corporations Law. 
Section 252D which deals with the Calling of 
Meetings under the Corporations Law allows for 
members to call meetings of all shareholders or 
meetings of only those shareholders who hold a 
particular class of shares. Shareholders who hold at 
least 5 per cent of the votes which may be cast at a 
general meeting of a company have the power to call 
and hold a meeting themselves or to require the 
directors to call and hold a meeting. Meetings may 
be held regularly or to resolve specific questions 
about the management or business of the company. 
The Corporations Law sets out rules dealing with 
shareholders‟ meetings. A shareholder of a company 
may ask the company for a copy of the record of a 
meeting or a decision of shareholders taken without 
a meeting. Different rights to vote at meetings of 
shareholders may attach to different classes of 
shares. This is dealt with under sections 250E, 
254A–254B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The 
buying and selling of shares in Australia are dealt 
with under sections 1091D–1091E of the 
Corporations Law. A shareholder may sell their 
shares but only if the sale does not breach the 
corporation‟s constitution. 
 
8. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
 
Compared to other developed financial markets, 
Australia‟s conditions favour shareholders when it 
comes to engaging with the companies they invest 
in. This is not only because of the rules in 
Australia‟s Corporations Act 2001 but also because 
of the large and growing pool of superannuation (i.e. 
pension) savings. Recent cases in Australia (such as 
Brickworks and Antares Energy) have attracted 
public attention to the rights of shareholders in 
Australia. The „two strikes rule‟ allows for 25 per 
cent of shareholders in a publicly listed company to 
vote down a company‟s remuneration report, 
requiring the board of directors to revisit its 
remuneration strategy. Further, there have been 
recent amendments to the regulatory guidelines in 
Australia confirming that shareholders may 
communicate with each other about the company‟s 
performance and act as „voting blocs‟. High profile 
examples of recent activism in Australia include 
Mark Carnegie (from Funds Manager, Perpetual 
Company) in relation to the Brickworks Company 
demanding board of directors representation. The 
activist Janchor Partners Company had demands 
specific to remuneration in respect of Medibank 
Private Company Industry. Activist and high-profile 
businessman Solomon Lew opposed the takeover 
terms by David Jones Company Industry, and finally, 
activist Lone Star Value Management demanded 
board of directors representation on Antares Energy 
Company Industry Board. Approximately 50 
Australian publicly listed companies have received 
some type of public demand from investors (Activist 
Insight Data, 2017) and activists have been elected 
to more than 100 board seats in corporate Australia 
through shareholder activism. 
Due to its legislative backing (and the 
increasing success that activism is enjoying) 
shareholder activism is not something that should 
not be ignored in the Australian context. It is 
important for representative boards of directors 
have a sound understanding of activism, and that 
they are well-advised on dealing with activists‟ 
concerns in the context of the Australian culture and 
its legal framework. 
 
9. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
 
The topic of corporate governance and firm 
performance represents a comprehensive and 
growing area of research internationally. In an 
Australian context, as elsewhere, there is a major 
difficulty in determining a causal relationship 
between corporate governance and firm 
performance (especially when it comes to the more 
subjective indicators of social, environmental and 
innovative performance). The results of empirical 
research in Australia remain firmly divided between 
„some support‟, „inconclusive support‟, and „no 
relationship‟ between corporate governance and 
organisational performance (largely depending on 
the independent and proxy dependent variables 
chosen to represent the relationship). Psaros (2009) 
provided a comprehensive meta-analysis on the link 
between corporate governance and economic 
performance and outlined the positive indirect 
relationship that corporate governance provides as a 
facilitator of economic performance. It was noted by 
Psaros (2009) that the “… editorial from the journal 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 
provides an endorsement for the economic merits of 
corporate governance: 
There has been much discussion recently about 
whether corporate governance makes a 
difference to the bottom line, that is, does 
corporate governance improve shareholder 
value? Whilst, in my view, the evidence, both 
academic and practitioner, points on balance 
towards the view that good corporate 
governance helps realise the value and create 
competitive advantage, this is more an intuitive 
feeling as the studies are trying to single out 
corporate governance variables that may 
affect performance and that is very difficult to 
do” (p. 32). 
In an Australian context, Linden and Matolcsy 
(2004) examined whether corporate governance was 
directly related to firm performance and measured 
this by the Howarth Corporate Governance Score. 
Linden and Matolcsy (2004) found that there was no 
significant relationship between corporate 
governance and traditional measures of firm 
performance. Despite these findings, scholars, 
legislators, managers and investors alike remain 
convinced that corporate governance practices are 
nonetheless important measures for sustainable 
societal outcomes. Further research is obviously 
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needed to form statistical or thematic relationships 
in this regard, as the majority of research is now 
somewhat dated (especially now that Australian 
corporations are becoming increasingly proactive 
with their use of corporate governance practices as 
bases for positive market differentiation). 
 
10. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a 
major factor in corporate governance in Australia 
over the past 20 years. In the practitioner sphere, 
the examination of CSR performance measures 
(specifically as corporate governance criteria) has 
been researched by a range of commercial firms 
(Baker & McKenzie, 2007; KPMG, 2005, 2006), as well 
as peak and professional bodies (Business Council of 
Australia, Centre for Corporate Public Affairs, CPA 
Australia and Volunteering Australia). As a result, a 
variety of indices have been developed by to 
evaluate the CSR performance of Australian 
companies, most notably: the St James Ethics 
Centre‟s Corporate Responsibility Index (2003), the 
Reputex SR Index (2005), and the Australian CSR 
Standards (AS 8003). In support of all these indices, 
the Australian Institute of Social and Ethical 
Accountability and Models of Success and 
Sustainability (MOSS) have emerged to provide 
guidance for corporations to implement, measure 
and report their CSR performance measures more 
effectively. 
 
11. CONCLUSION  
 
This article has provided an overview of the current 
legal and regulatory framework that underpins 
corporate governance in Australia and presents a 
review of the typical Australian entity ownership 
structures, board of director roles and 
responsibilities, along with concomitant 
remuneration strategies recommended by the 
Australian Stock Exchange Corporate Governance 
Council (ASX CGC) in 2019.  
Future research in Australia should be focussed 
on what can be done to achieve effective governance 
and appropriate culture within corporate Australia. 
As highlighted in the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) Report in 2018 which 
found a number of prominent cultural themes such 
as a widespread sense of complacency, a reactive 
stance in dealing with risks, being insular and not 
learning from experiences and mistakes, and an 
overly collegial and collaborative working 
environment which lessened the opportunity for 
constructive criticism, timely decision-making and a 
focus on outcomes which impacts on the over 
corporate governance of an entity. This was further 
emphasised by Hayne (2019) in his Final Report: 
Royal Commission into the Misconduct in the 
Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry where he noted that “… boards and senior 
executives who bear primary responsibility for what 
has happened, close attention must be given to their 
culture, their governance and their remuneration 
practices” (p. 4). 
Hayne further stated that the responsibility for 
corporate conduct lies with the board, and this has 
consequences for the board‟s role, priorities and 
accountability measures into the future. He has very 
clear expectations that Australian boards will need 
to probe senior management and ensure 
accountability. To ensure that occurs, boards will 
need to ensure that they are provided with timely 
information of sufficient quality (and the 
Commissioner has emphasised quality over 
quantity) to ensure they are able to do so. In the 
post-Royal Commission landscape, boards will need 
to ensure that they are across significant matters 
arising in the business more than ever.  
Finally, corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
has become a major interest and issue for many 
global organisations and certainly a major factor in 
corporate governance in Australia. The growing 
interest towards a sustainable society requires a new 
type of leadership that promotes CSR‟s ideals. 
Interestingly, Australia currently does not have 
mandatory reporting albeit many companies report 
voluntarily on social and environmental 
performance to meet annual disclosure obligations 
and demonstrate a commitment to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and future research can examine 
the affects of mandatory reporting requirements and 
the impact on the overall governance framework. 
Over a decade ago, both the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
and the Corporations and Markets Advisory 
Committee released reports examining the extent to 
which Australian companies should adopt corporate 
social responsibility. The reports concluded that 
corporate social responsibility can be an important 
means for companies to manage non-financial risks 
and maximise their long-term financial value.  
The complexities of the relationship of CEOs 
and board with respect to CSR deserve further 
large-scale investigation since current governance 
theory does not explain this well. The topic of board 
member skills warrants further research, as the 
findings by Backhouse (2014); Backhouse and 
Wickham (2017) highlight major gaps within ASF‟s 
board‟s skill set and experience, which was similar 
to findings by Ambachtsheer, Capelle, and Lum 
(2007). Ambachtsheer et al. (2007) quite rightly 
point out that board expertise and knowledge affect 
board practices including strategic thinking. Drucker 
(1976) was also concerned that the US lacked 
well-governed boards and advocated for 
professional rather than amateur boards with 
relevant and composite skill and experience sets. 
One limitation of this research relates to the 
country-specific location of the research effort. It 
could usefully be expanded to include the United 
Kingdom. 
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